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Abstract. The emerging Europe has been hardest hit by the surge in the non-performing 
loans (NPLs) in the aftermath of the global financial turbulence and the crisis-induced 
recession. The surge in the NPLs generated a severe banking distress, and left a legacy of a 
debt overhang that dramatically constrained bank lending and served as a drag on economic 
growth in the post-crisis period. We quantitatively study the determinants of loan losses in 
static and dynamic panel models with a focus on the linkages between the macro-financial 
vulnerabilities and a wide range of bank specific variables in 20 emerging European 
countries during 2000-2011. Our results indicate that the NPL dynamics have been 
particularly sensitive to real GDP growth, and inflation, while bank profitability as a proxy 
for management quality plays a significant role in constraining loan defaults. By contrast, 
higher lending rates may lead to adverse selection problems, and hence reduces loan 
quality. There is also some weak evidence that rapid credit growth as a measure of 
excessive risk taking in lending serves as a precursor to worsening loan portfolio quality. 
We observe, based on a unique data set, that banks in the region increasingly employ 
advanced risk management regimes (Internal Rating Based, IRB) with the potential to 
better monitor and evaluate loan quality and hence, rein on problem loans. 
Keywords. Non-performing loans in emerging Europe, Panel estimation, Generalized 
Method of Moments 
JEL. G21, G28, G32. 
 
1. Introduction 
he onset of the global financial crisis in late 2008 followed by the sovereign 
debt strains in the European Union has left a legacy of non-performing loans 
(NPLs) in emerging Europe. Prior to the crisis, emerging European 
countries have registered a rapid yet unsustainable credit growth, fueled by massive 
capital inflows largely intermediated by the foreign-dominated banking sectors and 
that ended abruptly with the advent of the global financial crisis (2008-2009).  As a 
result, in the post-2009 period, the non-performing loans in the region surged with 
the sharp deterioration in loan quality (Brown and Lane, 2011) and the ratio as 
percent of volume of loans outstanding currently stands at 11 percent on average in 
the region (European Banking Coordination “Vienna” Initiative (EBCI), 2012).  
Although the accumulation of bad loans did not threaten the overall bank 
stability
1
, the gravity of the problem differed substantially across the region and 
banks showed varying performance both in terms of the deterioration in their credit 
quality, and hence, in terms of the level of NPLs during the 2009-2011 period.
2
 
Figures 1-3 in the Appendix show the evolution of the NPL ratios for each group in 
the sample. As is clear, NPLs are higher on average, almost double the magnitude 
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of the ratios registered in Central Europe and hence, more problematic for the East 
and Southeast European economies, reaching unprecedented levels in some 
countries in the region. 
The rapid deterioration in loan portfolio quality could be attributed to the severe 
contraction in the economic activity and the subsequent stagnation in credit, partly 
due to the constrained access of banks in the region to wholesale borrowing 
markets which led to a sizeable reduction in their profitability. Given the relatively 
slow resolution of the problem, it is feared
3
 that the lingering NPLs and debt 
overhang can continue to hold back economic recovery by fostering a permanent 
state of credit stagnation, which currently remains subdued in most of the region.  
A growing body of research argues that problem loans can be explained by both 
macro-specific factors and bank-level characteristics in addition to measures of 
institutional quality, effectiveness of prudential regulations and risk management 
sophistication. Several papers assess macro-financial linkages between credit 
markets and macroeconomic performance (Espinoza & Prasad, 2010; Nkusu, 2011) 
while others investigate the effects of worsening loan quality on the macro 
economy using the vector autoregressive (VAR) method as in Quagliariello (2008) 
and the panel-vector autoregressive (PVAR) system as in Espinoza and Prasad 
(2010) and Nkusu (2011).  On the other hand, several articles investigate the role of 
bank-specific factors behind in the deterioration of loan quality (Salas and Saurina, 
2002; Espinoza and Prasad, 2010; Louzis et al., 2011; Nkusu, 2011). Additionally, 
Podpiera (2004) employs an extended panel data set of 65 countries for the period 
1998-2002 and finds a significant effect for the compliance with Basel Core 
Principles on NPLs, controlling for different levels of financial and economic 
development and other macroeconomic and structural factors.  In contrast, 
Sundararajan et. al. (2001) find that an overall index of BCP compliance is not a 
significant determinant of measures of bank soundness, namely nonperforming 
loans (NPLs) and loan spreads. Stein et. al. (2003) use an extensive databank on 
default rates in order to quantify the competitive advantages that can be gained by a 
credit institution from applying more advanced rating systems. 
This paper analyzes the key driving factors behind the region’s loan quality 
dynamics and in particular, the relative importance of macroeconomic and bank-
specific factors for the evolution of NPLs for a panel data of 20 emerging European 
countries
4
 for the 2000-2011 period. We study the dynamics of NPLs in static 
(fixed and random effects) and dynamic (GMM) panel models, employing a wide 
range of variables, while controlling for the impact of the global financial crisis. In 
recent years, banks in the region have increasingly moved in the direction of better 
risk management and implemented advanced internal-based risk management 
regimes (Internal Rating Based, IRB) to better monitor and evaluate loan quality 
but still lag behind their Western European counterparts. Using a unique data on 
the IRB usage rates in each country’s banking system, we also explore whether 
IRB improves loan quality, and reduce the incidence of credit defaults. Clearly, our 
results on the effectiveness of IRB should be treated with caution due to the short 
span of implementation period. To our knowledge, no previous empirical literature 
have investigated the causes of loan defaults in emerging Europe, based on 
dynamic panel methods, while using a rich set of macro-financial data enhanced 
with a risk management measure, IRB.  
Our study confirms in the context of emerging Europe that NPLs are counter-
cyclical and adverse macroeconomic shocks worsens credit risk. It shows that he 
NPL dynamics have been particularly sensitive to specific macroeconomic 
variables, most notably, the real GDP growth, and inflation. Among several bank-
level measures, bank profitability as a proxy for management quality plays a 
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significant role in constraining loan defaults. In contrast, lending rates (and interest 
spread) raise the rate of credit defaults by leading to adverse selection problems. 
There is also some weak evidence that rapid credit growth as a measure of 
excessive risk taking in banking serves as a precursor to NPLs. Rapid credit growth 
enhances bank fragility and serves as a precursor to a severe deterioration in the 
quality of loan portfolios. The fact that the loan quality dropped severely in the 
post-crisis period, underlines the vulnerability of region’s banks to the external 
shocks transmitted thorough strong trade and financial links to Europe. We also 
find that banks in the region increasingly employ advanced risk management 
regimes (Internal Rating Based, IRB) with the potential to significantly reduce the 
incidence of problem loans.  Our empirical findings are expected to guide policy 
decisions to ensure financial system soundness by designing and implementing 
appropriate countercyclical macro-prudential regulation and advanced internal risk-
management regimes at the bank level to enhance monitoring of early warning 
indicators of a possible banking distress due to loan defaults. 
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section discusses the related literature 
on the NPLs. Section 3 discusses the data, the variables and the expected signs. 
Section 4 presents the econometric methodology, justifies the regression 
specifications and presents the results of the Fixed Effect, Random Effect and 
GMM estimations. Section 5 concludes with a summary of findings and policy 
implications. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The interaction between adverse macroeconomic shocks and the deterioration in 
loan quality is well-documented for both advanced and developing economies. The 
empirical literature provides evidence on the linkages between business cycles and 
performance in banking. Economic booms are associated with rising revenues, 
which strengthen the borrower’s debt servicing capacity. On the other hand, 
recessionary shocks are transmitted to bank balance sheets through a worsening of 
their credit portfolio. Pesola (2001, 2010) argues that loan losses from the banking 
crises in Nordic and other European countries stem from the high exposure of 
banks to strong adverse aggregate shocks, and the overall level of financial fragility 
as measured by aggregate indebtedness, affects banks’ loan losses jointly with 
macroeconomic shocks. Moreover, the impact of an adverse macroeconomic shock 
is amplified if the prevailing level of financial fragility (indebtedness) is high. 
Nkusu (2011) study a panel of 26 advanced economies for the 1998-2009 period 
and confirms that adverse macroeconomic shocks associate with rising NPLs.
5
 
These results confirm repeatedly that the NPLs are highly sensitive to systemic 
macroeconomic disturbances and business cycle shocks. 
A growing trend in the literature attributes loan quality not only to 
macroeconomic factors but also bank-specific characteristics and highlight the 
significance of bank-level vulnerabilities for worsening loan quality. Espinoza and 
Prasad (2010) study a dynamic panel model to assess the relative significance of a 
rich array of macro and bank specific variables for loan losses.
6
 Using a panel of 80 
banks in the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) region in 1995-2008, they find that 
NPL ratio worsens as economic growth decelerates and interest rates and risk 
aversion increase. In their view, the financial crisis during 2008-2009 highlights 
the strong linkages that exist between macroeconomic conditions and the banking 
system specifics as key determinants of NPLs. Their confirmed hypothesis is that 
that the more fragile a banking system is, the more likely it is to experience 
problems when an unexpected macroeconomic shock hits. Bofondi and Ropele 
(2011) find that the ratio of bad loans to the outstanding amount of loans at Italian 
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banks can be explained by the general state of the economy, the cost of borrowing, 
and the burden of debt. Yet, these variables affect households and firms at 
differential lags. Quagliariello (2007) also finds that the quality of loans at Italian 
banks follows a cyclical pattern related to the evolution of business cycles and that 
it also depends on bank-specific factors.  Dash and Kabra (2010) analyzes the 
evolution of NPLs in the Indian bank system with a focus on the interplay between 
macroeconomic factors such as GDP growth, inflation, real effective exchange 
rate, and the bank system characteristics given by real interest rate, bank size, 
annual growths in loans and ratio of loans to total assets. Salas and Saurina (2002) 
confirms for Spanish banks that, in addition to real GDP growth and past credit 
growth, leverage, portfolio composition, bank size, capital-assets ratio and market 
power affect credit risk and explain variations in NPLs. Louzis et al. (2011) 
investigate the determinants of NPLs in different loan categories such as consumer 
loans, business loans and mortgages in the Greek banking sector and confirm that 
both macroeconomic fundamentals and management quality matter for the level of 
credit defaults.  
 
3. Data, Variables and Expected Signs 
Our data consists a rich array of macroeconomic and banking data taken from 
the IMF, World Bank, and a country-level measure of IRB from the European 
Banking Authority (EBA). Our data covers the timing of the global financial crisis 
(in addition, the partially overlapping Eurozone crisis of 2009-11) and hence, gives 
us an opportunity to split the sample into pre- (pre-2009) and post-crisis (post-
2009) periods to analyze the effect of the crisis on the NPLs in the region with the 
help of a post-crisis dummy, DPOSTCR.   
 
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables  
 
  Pre-Crisis   Post-Crisis  
 Obs Mean St. Dev Obs Mean St. Dev 
NPL 119 8.252101  10.20108 54  10.61852 5.229635 
RGRWTH 162  5.500988  2.678149 54  -.1770371  5.881756 
INF 162  10.73194  18.77969 54  4.747889  10.01778 
CAP 146  11.12055  4.593382 54  10.89245  3.368511 
BPRIVCRGDP 155 32.4491  18.27733 54 54.71167  22.17066 
OVERHEAD 162 4.488642  2.300409 54 3.695741  3.455342 
ROE 162 13.5213  8.206247 54 2.244074  17.41388 
ROA 162 1.573704  1.184457 54 .3751852  1.85437 
LOANDEP 162 105.9376  62.07555 54 121.1706  36.28833 
LOANLOSS 127 71.01102  38.89395 54 67.96111  27.7014 
IRB 162 .0119284  .0610242 54 .1572926  .2308934 
 
We conduct our econometric analysis to assess how various macroeconomic 
and banks-specific variables affect the pattern of NPLs but also consider a novel 
and unique measure, IRB, for the percent of banks in a given country implementing 
advanced risk management systems to control credit risk. Table 1 gives the 
descriptive statistics on selected indicators for both pre-crisis and post-crisis 
period.  
It can be observed that on average, emerging European banks became less 
profitable, both in terms of ROE and ROA measures, yet still more cost-efficient as 
measured by overhead expenses, OVERHEAD in the post-crisis period. More 
importantly, they had less control over their credit risk as they register significantly 
more NPLs in the latter period. On the other hand, these banks are less capitalized 
as measured by CAP in the aftermath of the crisis. Strikingly, although there exists 
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a wide variation in terms of the intensity of IRB adoption rates across banks, the 
region’s banks have dramatically increased their IRB usage from 1.1 percent to 
15.7 percent in the post-crisis period in their attempt to control their credit risk 
while saving on expensive capital.  The trend in loan loss provisions to total loans, 
LOANLOSS, suggests that banks provisioned less reserves for their credit risk 
exposures in the post- crisis period, possibly due to more intense employment of 
IRB. 
At the macro-level, we include real GDP growth (RGRWTH) as a proxy for 
credit demand as well as business cycle shocks. In several studies on NPLs, there is 
a strong relation between macroeconomic vulnerabilities and non-performing loans 
and that recessions are key determinants of bad loans (Nkusu, 2011; Quagliarello, 
2007; Salas and Saurina, 2002; Pesola, 2007; Dash and Kabra, 2010).
7
 Hence, we 
expect a negative link between RGRWTH and NPL as credit risk is countercyclical 
and banks tend to better control their credit risk when the real economy is growing. 
We also include the change in CPI for inflation, INF, in our regression 
specifications. We expect a negative impact of inflation on NPL to the extent that 
rapid price increases worsen market frictions, forcing banks to ration credit (Boyd 
et. al., 2001). On the other hand, higher inflation can make debt servicing easier by 
reducing the real value of outstanding loans and hence, there may also be an 
additional negative impact of inflation on credit default, enhancing the effect of the 
negative sign on NPL. Yet, INF can also worsen the level of NPL when it captures 
deterioration in macroeconomic fundamentals and growing economic uncertainty. 
In this latter case, it might have a positive effect on NPL.
8
 Inflation can affect 
negatively the ability of the borrower to service debt.  Furthermore, when loan 
rates vary during time, inflation is most likely to affect negatively borrowers’ loan 
servicing capacity as long as lenders on the other hand will adjust rates to maintain 
their real returns (Nkusu, 2011).  
In addition, we use FX for the nominal exchange rate with negative or positive 
effects on on NPLs. One implication is that it can negatively affect the competition 
that exists between export-oriented firms, harming their debt servicing capacity 
(Fofack, 2005). The other implication is that the exchange rate can improve the 
debt-servicing capacity of those firms or borrowers that borrow in foreign currency 
(Nkusu, 2011).  
PREM stands for the risk premium on lending is calculated as the interest rate 
charged by banks on loans to private sector customers minus the "risk free" 
Treasury bill interest rate at which short-term government securities are issued or 
traded in the market. Higher the risk premium means that the country is considered 
as risky and this implies that the ratio of NPLs will be higher in those countries 
where the default risk is large. If the risk premium on lending is low, banks will 
have to issue fewer loans, reducing the number of non-performing loans. 
On the other hand, several bank characteristics affect the risk-taking behavior in 
lending and the risk management practices of banks, which can lead to high-risk 
loan portfolios.  A number of bank-specific controls have been included in the 
panel regressions as in the literature (Quagliariello, 2007; Salas and Saurina, 2002; 
Espinoza and Prasad, 2010). Since the charter value of banks increase with more 
profitability, higher return on equity, ROE, is likely to curb incentives for risk-
taking and may improve performance in monitoring loan quality. We include ROE 
or return on assets, ROA in our regressions as we expect higher profitability to lead 
to lower levels of NPLs.  
Loan to deposit ratio, LOANDEP is used as a measure of banks' relative access 
to external funding, and availability of wholesale funding which may also stand for 
the degree of financial deepening in the banking system. This effect is likely to 
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reduce NPL if it signals the quality of bank management as well. Yet, it may also 
serve as an indicator of risk-taking on the part of bank managers, as higher loans to 
deposits ratio may reflect the choices of bank managers for riskier loans as opposed 
to holding safer government securities. Larger the proportion of bank assets 
allocated to loans, greater the credit risk exposure, leading to a higher level of 
NPL. Hence, we expect either positive or negative sign for this variable, depending 
on which of the two effect dominates.  
Additionally, bank equity to assets, CAP, stands for the degree of bank solvency 
and may curb incentives for risk-taking for bank managers so we anticipate its sign 
to be negative. This variable is an approximation of banks’ financial health and 
strengths. If the bank capital faces a decline due to moral hazard incentives of 
banks’ managers, banks will experience higher NPLs since their position will be 
riskier (Espinoza and Prasad, 2010). We also add several other bank-specific 
variables such as LOANLOSS (loan loss reserves to gross loans) as a proxy for 
expected loan defaults and prudent measurement and management of these credit 
risks and 5-bank concentration ratio, CONCEN, to control for concentration in 
banking in different regression specifications.  
In line with the literature, we believe that managerial quality and cost efficiency 
of banks do matter for loan quality as in Louzis et al., (2011), Berger and DeYoung 
(1997) and Podpiera and Weill (2008). These authors attribute problem loans to 
bank-specific factors such as a worsening in banks’ cost efficiency. We include 
two measures of efficiency in our regressions specifications: OVERHEAD 
measures the operating costs including overhead expenses as percent of total assets 
and these variables are expected to have a positive effect on the NPL variable.  
As in Salas and Saurina (2002), we also include a variable, CRGRWTH in our 
regressions in lagged form. This is because rapid credit growth may lead to adverse 
selection, and may be associated with reduced credit quality as risk taking 
intensifies during such periods, adversely affecting the level of non-performing 
loans. Consequently, more reserves need to be provisioned for rising level of bad 
loans. Additionally, bank-credit to the private sector as percent of GDP, 
BPRIVCRGDP, is a measure of financial depth and is expected to have a negative 
effect on NPL.  
Lending rate, LENDR, is the bank rate on loans and usually this interest rate 
meets the financing needs of the private sector. Banks charging the highest interest 
rates are those that later have higher levels of problem loans (Salas and Saurian, 
2002). Higher lending rates may induce adverse selection in the pool of potential 
borrowers and raise the risks of default on loans. In addition, in the face of adverse 
income shocks, the borrower has greater probability to default when interest 
payments on borrowed funds are larger. Hence, higher lending rates are expected to 
enhance loan defaults.  Interest rate spread, SPR, is calculated as the difference 
between the interest rate charged by banks on loans minus the interest rate paid by 
banks on deposits and is expected to have a positive sign. Both lending rates and 
the interest spread as a proxy for cost of bank intermediation and market 
concentration should have a negative effect on loan quality.  
LY is a proxy for financial fragility calculated the total outstanding loans to 
nominal GDP (Pesola, 2010) and is expected to have a positive sign. It may also 
stand for financial deepening with a negative effect on NPLs. To the extent that it 
captures the risk appetite of banks, we expect the positive effect to dominate (Dash 
and Kabra, 2010). INDX is the index of accountability, transparency and the rule of 
law as a proxy for the institutional quality with a negative effect on NPLs.  As the 
judicial system resolves credit disputes more effectively, this index is expected to 
reduce the incidence of problem loans.  Additionally, LOANDEP stands for the 
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loan to deposit ratio and measures the degree to which funding comes from abroad 
to finance loans and can proxy for aggressive lending by banks through foreign 
borrowing, and possibly enhanced risk taking in lending.   
NRFB is the number of foreign owned banks and is usually associated with 
better risk management strategies, which may assist in building low risk loan 
portfolios. A larger foreign share in the banking sector is usually associated with 
lower reserves or a better loan portfolio quality. Yet, foreign banks may also 
engage in risky lending strategies, especially when their parent banks expect 
greater profitability from their subsidiaries located in emerging economies. LIQ is 
computed as the liquid assets to bank assets and serves as an approximation for 
bank efficiency. If the liquidity of a bank is low, this implies that its solvency is 
also low with a negative effect on NPLs (Salas and Saurina, 2002). It may also 
indicate risky managerial behavior, creating more chances of experiencing credit 
risks.  
 
4. Econometric Methodology 
4.1 Panel Estimation: Fixed and Random Effect Models 
We report a set of panel regressions to disentangle the impact of macro-specific 
and bank-specific variables on NPLs. In all of our regressions, we include a post-
crisis dummy for the period 2009 and on–DPOSTCR– to distinguish between pre- 
and post-crisis behavior of NPLs in emerging European banking. All panel 
regressions contain macroeconomic variables and bank-specific, time-varying 
control variables that measure the financial characteristics of the banks.  
We first estimate static fixed effect (FE) and random effect (RE) models and 
apply first F-test to test for the pooled OLS of Hausman test to determine whether 
the individual fixed effects are significantly correlated with the explanatory 
variables. The fixed effect model assumes that intercepts vary across the countries 
and can thus account for possible unobserved time invariant heterogeneity across 
countries. A random effects model, on the other hand, assumes that the individual 
country intercepts are random variables drawn from a common distribution. 
Our results strongly reject pooled OLS (POLS) in favor of fixed effects 
estimation, confirming the presence of a significant degree of country-level 
heterogeneity in NPL dynamics. The Hausman test also favors fixed effects 
estimation over random effects.  
After a series of serial correlation tests, we find that our dependent variable, 
exhibits a significant degree of serial correlation and persistence, which requires a 
dynamic specification in a panel context. Our estimations show that NPLs are very 
persistent, suggesting that the response of credit losses to the macroeconomic 
shocks could take time to materialize and possibly captures the feedback effect 
from loan losses back to the real economy. As a result, our modified panel 
specification includes a lagged dependent variable,        and becomes: 
 
                                               
                         (1) 
 
              
 
where    captures unobserved country-specific fixed effects,    is the 
unobservable time effect, and     is the white-noise error term.       is the 
logarithmic transformation of the aggregate ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans whereas the lagged dependent variable,        captures persistence in loan 
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quality over time.
9
 The set of explanatory variables include both macro-specific 
and bank-specific variables, and the post-crisis dummy.  
             is a vector of j macroeconomic variables including the real GDP 
growth (RGRWTH), bank credit to the private sector to GDP ratio (BPRIVCGDP), 
domestic credit growth rate (CRGRWTH) and inflation (INF). All of the macro 
variables enter equation (1) with a lag to account for plausible delay with which 
macroeconomic shocks affect banks’ credit portfolio. The macroeconomic 
variables are taken as strictly exogenous
10
, while bank-level variables are all one-
period lagged to control for potential endogeneity problem and are modeled here as 
predetermined.
11
 
 
TABLE 2. Pooled OLS, Fixed and Random Effects Estimation 
  
Dependent Variable: (Log) Non-Performing Loans to Total Loans (LNPL) 
 POLS (robust) FE (robust) RE  
LNPL(-1) .6692743*** .5616002*** .6636189*** 
RGRWTH -.0229839* -.0237798* -.0229879* 
INF -.0354177*** -.0288233*** -.0347289*** 
CRGRWTH(-1) .2078946 .149949 .2062253 
LENDR .0285032*** .0089371 .0273084*** 
ROA -.0554295** -.0343023 -.0540935** 
LOANLOSS -.0037429** -.0075513** -.0040067** 
DPOSTCR .326366*** .3563691*** .3280824*** 
No. Obs. 104 104 104 
Rsq (within) 0.8608 0.8386  
F-test (p-value) 0.000   
Hausman Test (p-value)  0.000  
*Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
We address concerns about the presence of unit roots in the series by 
conducting panel unit root tests for unbalanced panels. The Fisher-Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root tests, which are suitable for 
unbalanced panels, were conducted for all the variables used in the data set with 
time trends, lags and demeaning of cross-sectional means. Both the Fisher and Im-
Pesaran-Shin tests of unit roots consistently rejected the presence of unit roots for 
all variables included in regression specifications, indicating that they are 
stationary.
12
 Hence, we include them in equation (1) in levels without differencing. 
Based on the LM test for the joint significance of time effects, we find time effects 
to be jointly insignificant at 1 percent level, and hence, we only employ a post-
crisis dummy, DPOSTCR instead.   
In Table 2, we present the results from pooled OLS, Fixed and Random effects 
regressions by including a lagged dependent variable in specifications. In all 
regressions, lagged NPL is highly significant, suggesting strong persistence in the 
NPL series. However, the results should be treated with caution, as POLS 
estimation is inconsistent in the presence of country-level heterogeneity. On the 
other hand, fixed and random effects specifications with a lagged dependent 
variable cause bias in estimation. Notwithstanding these issues, several 
specifications have been tried with different combinations of macro and bank-
specific variables. The variables presented in Table 2 turned consistently 
significant in almost all regressions and this is why we report only these results. In 
addition, the signs and significance of the variables are almost identical regardless 
of the estimation method, confirming the robustness of our results. 
4.2 System and Difference-GMM Estimation  
Since NPL series display a considerable amount of persistence, dynamic panel 
estimation is the appropriate to generate consistent estimation. Hence, we apply 
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both system and difference- GMM estimation (two-step, robust) (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995) and report the results in Table 3. System-
GMM with forward orthogonalization procedure removes panel fixed effects and 
has the added benefit of better preserving sample size in our unbalanced panel than 
its alternative, the difference GMM. System GMM is preferred because exploiting 
the additional moment conditions in the levels equations provides a dramatic 
improvement in the accuracy of the estimates when the dependent variable is 
persistent (Blundell and Bond, 2000). The first-difference GMM estimator may 
potentially suffer from problems associated with weak instruments, such as 
substantial finite sample bias. The system GMM specification is estimated using 
the xtabond2 command in Stata (Roodman, 2005). We control the number of 
instruments by limiting our analysis to 2 lags as this helps avoid bias due to too 
many instruments in a relatively small sample.
13
 
We apply several GMM specification tests and the Arellano and Bond test for 
autocorrelation of order 1 and 2. The p-values greater than the significance level 
show that the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation (first-order 
autocorrelation does not imply inconsistent estimates, but we also find no evidence 
for it) should not be rejected and this confirms the validity of our instruments. 
Hence, our system GMM regressions are well-specified. As the p-values show, the 
Sargan tests fails to reject the validity of the exclusion restrictions at any common 
significance level. The Hansen-test of over identifying restrictions also suggests 
that the instruments are appropriate. 
Despite their different approaches, system GMM and difference- GMM as well 
as RE and FE and POLS all arrive at essentially similar results as to the sign, and 
the statistical significance of most variables in regression specification. This 
confirms that our results are robust to different specifications, although the 
precision of the estimated coefficients differs across different methods. 
 
TABLE 3. Difference and System GMM Estimation  
 
Dependent Variable: (Log) Non-Performing Loans to Total Loans (LNPL) 
 System-GMM 
(Two-step robust) 
Diff-GMM 
(Two-step) 
Diff-GMM 
(Two-step robust) 
    
LNPL(-1) .6473829*** .5201994*** .6116519*** 
RGRWTH -.0284554*** -.0287665*** -.0292947* 
INF -.0509454*** -.0279753*** -.0303967** 
CRGRWTH(-1)  .3272964** .3453989 
LENDR .0636785*** .016262 .0259842 
BPRIVCRGDP .002424   
CAP  .0323014  
ROA  -.0499429*** -.073125** 
LOANLOSS  -.013734*** -.8708316*** 
DPOSTCR .3439542** .0821813 .113305 
IRB -.3578975   
No. Obs. 109 71 73 
No. Instruments 27 18 16 
Wald test statistics 503.34 2.84e+06 4112.86 
AR(1) p-value 0.099 0.3378 0.9021 
AR(2) p-value 0.415 0.8063 0.7207 
Sargan p-value  0.4120 0.4752 
Hansen p-value 0.878   
*Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
Based on the Tables 2 and 3, our econometric results show that lagged 
dependent variable, NPL(-1) is significant for all specifications, confirming a 
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considerable amount of persistence in NPL dynamics in the region. As expected, 
NPLs increased significantly in the post-crisis period as evidenced by the 
significant positive sign of the DPOSTCR variable and this result is robust in 
different specifications and when controlling for a battery of bank-specific and 
macroeconomic variables. In almost all specifications, RGRWTH, INF, ROA, 
LOANLOSS, LENDR appear significant with the correct signs. Most notably, 
RGRWTH and INF as proxies for macroeconomic shocks are significant in all 
models, confirming that as in other countries, the emerging European banks are 
quite vulnerable to macroeconomic risks and high volatility in the GDP. In 
addition, inflation, INF is very significant with a negative impact on the NPLs, 
suggesting that inflation reduces the real debt obligations of borrowers and hence, 
lowers the level of credit defaults. As expected, lending interest rate, LENDR 
(along with interest rate spread, SPR) has a significant positive effect on the level 
of credit risk, raising the cost of loans and borrowers’ ability to service their loans. 
There is some evidence based on the signs of BPRIVCRGDP and lagged 
CRGRWTH that rapid credit growth leads to a faster accumulation of NPLs but 
these variables are significant in only limited number of regressions (Tables 2 and 
3). Still, they both have the correct signs in line with the literature which condemns 
unsustainable lending booms as a factor leading to increased financial fragility in 
the emerging European banking. This result may also justify central bank actions to 
limit excessive lending growth to ensure financial stability.  
On the other hand, a rich variety of variables considered in different 
specifications such as LIQ, NRFB, INDX, OVERHEAD, CONCEN do not affect 
NPLs in a significant manner, so they have been dropped from estimation. It is also 
noteworthy that IRB (taken as an endogenous variable, and instrumented as such in 
System GMM specification) has the right sign but lacks significance, possibly 
because of the short span of data. This confirms that sophisticated risk management 
systems implemented at the bank level has the potential to improve loan quality 
and reduce the incidence of loan defaults. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Understanding the causes of NPLs is crucial for designing appropriate 
prudential regulatory measures to reinforce financial stability in the banking 
sectors, and to strengthen their robustness to better absorb macroeconomic shocks. 
Our empirical results support the view that NPL dynamics are strongly influenced 
by domestic macroeconomic factors such as periods of low growth and recessions 
as there is strong evidence of a significant inverse relationship between GDP 
growth and nonperforming loans. This underlines the importance of macro-specific 
business cycle shocks as the critical variable for loan defaults. Equally important is 
the significance of the global financial turbulence in raising the level of NPLs, and 
hence, the vulnerability of the banks and the borrowers in the region to external 
shocks via trade and financial links. Inflation is yet another variable which strongly 
affects NPLs in a negative manner.  
We also find some evidence that rapid credit growth is a precursor (and serves 
as a warning indicator) for the subsequent surge in the NPLs, and financial fragility 
along with high lending rates and interest rate spreads. Hence, the regulators should 
closely monitor the rate of credit growth to prevent an excessive and destabilizing 
increase in the overall NPL levels and adopt policy measures to reduce the lending 
rates by cutting taxes on intermediation, fostering competition and required reserve 
ratios. A stronger focus on macro-prudential regulation, particularly through capital 
and liquidity buffers, and countercyclical provisioning, could help mitigate the 
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impact of macroeconomic risks on the banking systems of the region and the 
feedback effects of rising credit risks on their economies.  
Although bank-specific factors such as capital adequacy, liquidity, market 
concentration and the degree of foreign ownership do not seem to play a significant 
role in influencing the level of NPLs, bank profitability as a proxy for management 
quality has a strong negative influence on NPLs, similar to the effect of loan-
provisioning as a proxy for prudent lending behavior. This suggests that better-
managed banks are also better in loan evaluation and monitoring and hence, 
experience lower rates of NPLs. Our results, interestingly, show that foreign banks 
do not seem to differ from (or have superiority over) their domestic counterparts in 
terms of reining in on credit defaults contrary to expectations. Foreign banks, with 
experience and better management skills, are expected to build lower risk 
portfolios and thus restrain the growth of bad loans. Our results may point to the 
aggressive lending style (and somewhat excessive risk taking) of most foreign 
banks in the emerging economies in search for relatively high profit expectations 
from their affiliated banks in the region. 
In the last few years, the emerging European banks have begun to implement 
advanced risk management techniques such as internal risk management 
techniques (IRB) in compliance with the Basel Core Principles but they 
significantly lag behind their Western European counterparts in promoting such 
risk control mechanisms. In this paper, we find some evidence that such risk 
management regimes have the potential to reduce NPLs, while generating capital 
savings, thereby help promote more profitability and stability for these banking 
sectors. Tighter supervision of banks and better monitoring of credit risks thorough 
advanced risk management systems reduce the incidences of excessive risky taking 
by banks and help stabilize NPL levels.  Banks should regularly monitor loan 
quality through such measures and use stress tests for different levels of 
contingencies to alert regulators on potential bank weaknesses. Transparency of 
bank balance sheets is invaluable for the regulators as early-warning signals can be 
corrected in an effective and timely manner. The justice system and the legal 
framework should also be strengthened to resolve potential disputes between banks 
and the borrowers and hence, to promote a fast resolution of NPLs with effective 
and timely liquidation of collateral, given the limited market for distressed debt in 
the region.  
 
Notes 
 
1 In emerging Europe, high capital adequacy ratios and relatively high provisioning provide important 
buffers against bank insolvency due to NPL write-offs. An average capital adequacy ratio of about 
17 percent puts these banking systems at the top end of the spectrum in international comparisons. 
Loan provisioning at relatively high levels are also considered prudent. 
2 Fast credit expansion was the main contributor to economic growth in these countries prior to the 
financial and economic crisis of 2009-2010. The entry of foreign banks, particularly banks from 
EU-15 countries intermediated large capital inflows into the region’s affiliated banks. Given the 
huge untapped catching-up and profit potential and the progress made in EU integration, by the end 
of 2008, foreign bank penetration into the region reached well above 80 percent of total banking 
sector assets in most countries, with Austrian, German, Italian and French investors taking the lead. 
It is argued that the rising profit orientation and the increase in the risk proclivity of foreign banks 
was the main driver behind the fast credit growth rates in the emerging European banks. The global 
economic crisis and the subsequent increase in bad loans led to a breakdown of this debt-led growth 
model in the region.  
3 The danger lies in the fact that unresolved NPLs tend to constrain recovery from the recession in the 
region as debt overhang due to the overextended borrowers hinders the reallocation of their assets to 
more productive uses. 
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4Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, and Ukraine.  
5  The study uses a variety of macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth, unemployment, 
inflation, interest rates, changes in housing and stock price indices, private sector credit to GDP 
growth and exchange rate. 
6 They use real GDP growth, stock market returns, interest rates, world trade growth, VIX index (a 
proxy for global risk aversion), capital adequacy ratio, ROE, size, lagged net interest margin and 
lagged credit growth. 
7 In a recession, real GDP growth slows down or turns negative, generating an increase in credit 
default rates. By contrast, a positive growth in real GDP leads to higher income, which in turn 
contributes to higher debt servicing capacity of the borrowers and thus lowering the ratio of non-
performing loans. 
8 For instance, Fofack (2005) claims that inflation contributes to high level of non-performing loans in 
those countries that use flexible exchange rate regimes. 
9 The ratio of reserves for impaired loans to total loans is bound by zero and is equal to one. We use 
its logarithmic transformation so that it spans a wider interval over [−∞; +∞] (see Salas and Saurina, 
2002; Espinoza and Prasad, 2010). 
10 These variables can be instrumented by themselves as “IV-style” instruments in System GMM 
estimations. See Roodman (2006). 
11 Hence, they are instrumented in the GMM-style in the same way as the lagged dependent variable. 
12 The null hypothesis is that all series are non-stationary and the alternative hypothesis is that at least 
one of the series in the panel is stationary. 
13 The macroeconomic variables were considered as strictly exogenous (i.e. can be instrumented by 
itself as a one-column “IV-style” instrument, see Roodman, 2006), while the lagged bank-level 
variables, including the IRB, were modeled as predetermined (and need to be instrumented GMM-
style in the same way as the lagged dependent variable).  
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Appendix:  NPL Dynamics in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe 
Figure 1:  
                   
Figure 2:  
 
 
Figure 2:  
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